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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 11-1172 
No. 11-1173 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                                                            Appellant 
v. 
 
JASON KELLER 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 09-cr-00237) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 8, 2011 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, BARRY, Circuit Judges and 
SLOMSKY*,
                                                 
     *  The Honorable Joel H. Slomsky, District Judge for the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 District Judge 
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(Filed: December 14, 2011) 
 
Laura S. Irwin 
Michael L. Ivory 
Office of the United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street 
Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000 
 Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sally A. Frick 
437 Grant Street 
Frick Building 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000 
Attorney for Appellee 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to interpret § 2K2.1(b)(6) of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), which increases a 
defendant’s offense level by four points when he “used or 
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another 
felony offense.”  In a trio of cases over the past decade, we 
crafted a test for district courts to use in deciding when to apply 
USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6).  We held that for an offense to count as 
“another felony offense,” it must be distinguished from the 
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firearms offense of conviction in two ways: the offense conduct 
must (1) be distinct in time or conduct, and (2) require proof of 
an additional element.  This appeal requires us to consider 
whether Amendment 691 to the Sentencing Guidelines vitiates 
our precedents holding that USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) does not apply 
when the predicate offense is burglary of the firearms that are 
the subject of the conviction. 
I 
 In 2007, Jason Keller and two others tried to burglarize 
three gun shops in Western Pennsylvania, succeeding in one of 
the attempts.  Their modus operandi involved stealing a vehicle 
and using it to break into a store that sold firearms.  That plan 
proved to be easier said than done.  On their first try, they 
fastened straps to both the vehicle and the doors of Kaufman’s 
Antique and Gun Shop in Aliquippa and attempted to rip the 
door from its hinges, but their straps broke.  Almost two weeks 
later, Keller and his cohorts tried to burglarize Gander Mountain 
in Coraopolis by ramming its doors with a van.  This time, the 
transmission failed before the doors did.  Approximately two 
weeks later, Keller and his co-conspirators drove a vehicle 
through the front doors of Fazi’s Firearms in Plum Boro and 
absconded with thirty firearms.  After his apprehension, Keller 
confessed that he sold about eighteen of the firearms to 
“Adrian” in Maryland for $2,000. 
 A grand jury of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania indicted Keller for conspiracy 
to commit an offense against the United States in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and stealing firearms from a federally licensed 
firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u).  The 
Government subsequently filed an information against Keller, 
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charging him with possessing an unregistered firearm in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).  Keller pleaded guilty to all 
three offenses. 
 The Probation Office prepared a Presentence 
Investigation Report, calculating Keller’s total offense level as 
27 and his criminal history category as I, resulting in an advisory 
Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months imprisonment.  The offense 
level included a four-point enhancement pursuant to USSG § 
2K2.1(b)(6), which must be applied “[i]f the defendant used or 
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another 
felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or 
ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it 
would be used or possessed in connection with another felony 
offense.”1
II 
  The Probation Office concluded that Keller’s 
burglary of Fazi’s Firearms was “another felony offense” 
justifying application of the enhancement.  Keller filed a 
sentencing memorandum contesting the enhancement.  Noting 
that the issue was “close,” the District Court found that the 
enhancement did not apply to Keller’s conduct.  Over the 
Government’s objection, the Court reduced Keller’s Guidelines 
range to 46 to 57 months and sentenced him to 48 months in 
prison.  The Government filed this timely appeal. 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
                                                 
 1 Section 2K2.1(b)(6) was amended in the 2011 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.  The relevant language in this 
most recent edition is found in subsection (B) of USSG 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6). 
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and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). 
 The sole issue in this appeal concerns the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, which we review de 
novo.  United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2009); 
see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
III 
A 
 Section 2K2.1(b)(6) of the 2010 Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual was previously found at § 2K2.1(b)(5).  Interpreting that 
provision, we were confronted more than once with a case 
involving a defendant, like Keller here, who had possessed or 
stolen one or more firearms in the course of a single criminal 
act, and was thereafter convicted of a federal firearms offense.  
For example, in United States v. Fenton, the defendant broke 
into a sporting goods store, stole several firearms, and received 
the enhancement.2
                                                 
 2 The application notes to the then-applicable version of 
the Guidelines provided: “‘Felony offense,’ as used in 
subsection (b)(5), means any offense (federal, state, or local) 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction 
obtained.”  USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.7 (2000).  A similar note is 
now found at USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C).  See infra Part III.B. 
  309 F.3d 825, 826 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Recognizing a circuit split over whether the burglary could 
trigger the enhancement, we held that “‘another felony offense’ 
cannot apply to the same felonious conduct for which the 
criminal defendant is being sentenced.”  Id. at 827.  We 
reasoned that to give effect to the word “another,” the defendant 
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must have committed a felony that was separate from the 
firearms possession offense.  Id. at 827–28.  Because “almost 
every federal weapons offense could be prosecuted 
simultaneously under state law[] . . . deciding this issue [to the 
contrary] would require enhancement for almost every weapons 
offense.”  Id. at 828.  Therefore, we articulated a “distinction in 
time or conduct” test for applying the enhancement.  Id. 
 We revised the Fenton rule in United States v. Lloyd, 361 
F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2004).  In that case, Lloyd placed a bomb 
under the car of a man who had pursued a woman who was 
dating one of Lloyd’s criminal associates.  Id. at 199.  The 
District Court enhanced Lloyd’s Guidelines range over an 
objection based on Fenton that the enhancement was 
inappropriate because he had committed only one criminal act.  
Id. at 199–200.  We again observed that “[t]he word ‘another’ 
avoids . . . [the] absurd result” of automatic enhancement based 
on the offense of conviction, and we noted “it is equally clear 
that the guideline was not intended to exclude only the technical 
offense of conviction from the scope of ‘another felony 
offense.’”  Id. at 200.  To assist in distinguishing between cases 
involving impermissible double counting and permissible 
enhancement for other felonies, we imported the same-elements 
test pronounced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 
(1932), which is used in the double jeopardy context.  Id.  
Accordingly, we held that “the ‘distinction in time or conduct’ 
test set forth in Fenton requires that a felony offense must at 
least satisfy Blockburger before it may be used to adjust a 
sentence upward under § 2K2.1(b)(5).”  Id. at 200–01.  We 
explained that because thefts and burglaries of firearms are 
species of possession offenses, they are not “other” offenses.  Id. 
at 201–02.  Stating that we would not “read too much into 
[Fenton’s] ‘distinction of time or conduct’ requirement,” and 
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relying on the fact that Lloyd had committed no mere theft or 
burglary, we held that his range was properly enhanced.  Id. at 
203–05. 
 United States v. Navarro, 476 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2007), 
served as a capstone for Fenton and Lloyd.  Navarro confessed 
to drug distribution, which was used as the predicate “[]other 
felony offense” to enhance his sentence for possessing a firearm 
as a convicted felon.  Id. at 190–91.  We explained that “a two-
part standard may be distilled” from Fenton and Lloyd: 
The first part of the test, from Blockburger, is 
legal in nature and asks whether the predicate 
offense and the firearms possession crime each 
have an element that is not shared by the other.  
The second part of the test, from Fenton, is 
essentially factual in nature and asks whether 
more than mere possession of the firearm—
brandishment or other use—was an integral 
aspect of the predicate offense.  If these two 
questions are answered in the affirmative, then the 
four-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5) 
should apply. 
Id. at 196 (citations and footnote omitted).3
                                                 
 3 Anticipating the case we decide today, the quoted 
passage included a footnote: 
  Evaluating the drug 
 
Although not directly relevant to resolution of this 
case, it should be noted that the application notes 
of section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines have been 
amended, and the amendments became effective 
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distribution offense under this standard, we held the 
enhancement was correctly applied to Navarro.  Id. at 196–97. 
B 
 In 2006, the Sentencing Commission proposed an 
amendment to USSG § 2K2.1, which was eventually adopted as 
Amendment 691 and incorporated into the Guidelines.  See 
USSG supp. app. C amend. 691, at 170–77.  In addition to 
adding a subsection (5), which bumped the guideline at issue 
here to subsection (6), and other changes not relevant here, the 
Commission removed Application Note 15, which stated that 
“‘another felony offense’ . . . refer[s] to offenses other than 
explosives or firearms possession or trafficking offenses,” and 
inserted a new Application Note 14, which states in relevant 
part: 
(A)  In General.—Subsections (b)(6) and (c)(1) 
apply if the firearm or  ammunition 
facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, 
another  felony offense or another offense, 
                                                                                                             
in November 2006.  See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 14 (providing 
for broader interpretation of “another felony 
offense,” covering even those offenses that 
involve only simple possession of a firearm).  We 
recognize that the amendments call into question 
our decision in Fenton for defendants who are 
sentenced under the current Guidelines and 
application notes. 
 
Navarro, 476 F.3d at 196 n.11. 
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respectively. 
(B)  Application When Other Offense is 
Burglary or Drug Offense.— Subsections 
(b)(6) and (c)(1) apply (i) in a case in which a 
defendant  who, during the course of a 
burglary, finds and takes a firearm, even if 
 the defendant did not engage in any other 
conduct with that firearm  during the course of 
the burglary; and (ii) in the case of a drug 
 trafficking offense in which a firearm is 
found in close proximity to  drugs, drug 
manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia. In 
these  cases, application of subsections (b)(1) and 
(c)(1) is warranted because  the presence of 
the firearm has the potential of facilitating another 
 felony offense or another offense, 
respectively. 
(C)  Definitions.— 
 “Another felony offense”, for purposes of 
subsection (b)(6), means any  Federal, state, 
or local offense, other than the explosive or 
firearms  possession or trafficking offense, 
punishable by imprisonment for a  term exceeding 
one year, regardless of whether a criminal charge 
was  brought, or a conviction obtained. 
USSG supp. app. C amend. 691, at 171–72, 174–75 (emphasis 
added); see USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14.  Explaining the basis for 
the Amendment, the Sentencing Commission wrote: 
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[T]he amendment addresses a circuit conflict 
pertaining to the application of current 
§2K2.1(b)(5) (re-designated by this amendment as 
§2K2.1(b)(6)[] and (c)(1)), specifically with 
respect to the use of a firearm “in connection 
with” burglary and drug offenses. . . . [T]he 
amendment provides that in burglary offenses, 
these provisions apply to a defendant who takes a 
firearm during the course of the burglary, even if 
the defendant did not engage in any other conduct 
with that firearm during the course of the 
burglary. . . . The Commission determined that 
application of these provisions is warranted in 
these cases because of the potential that the 
presence of the firearm has for facilitating another 
felony offense or another offense. 
USSG supp. app. C amend. 691, at 177.  Thus, subsection (B) of 
Application Note 14 sets forth the Commission’s view of the 
correct application of subsection (A)—the facilitation 
requirement—in the special cases of burglary and drug 
trafficking offenses. 
C 
 In Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court 
considered “the legal force of commentary” to the Guidelines.  
508 U.S. 36, 43 (1993).  A unanimous Court rejected the 
analogy that commentary is to a guideline as a regulation is to a 
statute, because commentary “is not the product of delegated 
authority for rulemaking.”  Id. at 44.  Instead, “the guidelines are 
the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies,” 
and the “commentary . . . assist[s] in the interpretation and 
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application of those rules.”4
IV 
  Id. at 44–45.  The Court thus 
applied the same deferential standard it accords to an 
administrative agency’s reading of its own regulations.  
“[P]rovided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations 
does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be 
given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.’”  Id. at 45 (quoting Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).  
Significant to this appeal, the Court observed that Congress 
intended the Commission to revise the Guidelines periodically 
based on how the courts have interpreted them.  Id. at 46.  
“Amended commentary is binding on the federal courts even 
though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial 
constructions of a particular guideline cannot prevent the 
Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation that 
satisfies the standard we set forth today.”  Id. 
 As our discussion of Stinson demonstrates, we are bound 
by the commentary to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6).  Although we held 
in Fenton that the offense of burglary to steal firearms could not 
serve as the predicate for a USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement, 
the Commission sided with those courts of appeals that had held 
to the contrary.  Accordingly, the rule we stated in Fenton and 
reaffirmed in Lloyd and Navarro is no longer valid to the extent 
                                                 
 4 The Court limited its holding that commentary “is akin 
to an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules” to the 
“type of commentary” at issue in Stinson.  508 U.S. at 45.  
Because the Stinson Court considered an application note to a 
guideline, see id. at 39, as we do here, its holding controls. 
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it was applied to the burglary and drug trafficking offenses 
referenced in Application Note 14(B).5  In short, Amendment 
691 has eroded our prior decisions.6
 Keller is left to argue under Stinson either that 
Application Note 14 conflicts with a statute or the Constitution, 
or that it is “plainly erroneous” or inconsistent with USSG 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6).  See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 47.  Keller does not 
suggest a statutory or constitutional conflict (and we find none), 
but he asserts that it is plainly erroneous to treat burglary 
differently from all other felonies that might serve as a 
triggering offense under the guideline. 
 
 We see no plain error or inconsistency for three reasons.  
First, Note 14 is entirely consistent with the plain language of 
the guideline.  The meaning of USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) is 
                                                 
 5 Whether anything remains of the Fenton, Lloyd, and 
Navarro line of cases outside of the burglary and drug 
trafficking contexts is a question we leave for another day.  
 
 6 Keller contends that the District Court was free to 
disregard Amendment 691 under United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005), in part because Booker renders the Guidelines 
advisory, and in part because he claims it casts doubt on Stinson, 
which was decided in an era of mandatory Guidelines.  But 
Keller misreads Booker.  The discretion to vary pursuant to the 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not eliminate the need to 
calculate the Guidelines range accurately in the first instance.  
See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“Courts must continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines 
sentence precisely as they would have before Booker.” (citing 
United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2006))). 
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ambiguous in cases where the purported other felony is very 
closely related to the firearms offense.  The Commission 
resolved that ambiguity with respect to cases, like this case and 
Fenton, in which a burglary is committed for the purpose of 
obtaining firearms.  Second, the fact that Amendment 691 
resolved a circuit split evidences sufficient difference of opinion 
to belie the claims of plain error and inconsistency.  The breadth 
of opinion among appellate judges suggests that the guideline is 
subject to different interpretations.7  Finally, we observe that all 
three of our sister circuits to consider the matter have found that 
subsection (B) of Note 14 is not inconsistent with the guideline. 
 See United States v. Krumwiede, 599 F.3d 785, 790–91 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Hill, 563 F.3d 572, 581 (7th 
Cir. 2009));8
 Therefore, we are satisfied that Amendment 691, which 
clarified that a burglary of firearms counts as “another felony 
offense,” is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with USSG § 
2K2.1(b)(6). 
 United States v. Blalock, 571 F.3d 1282, 1288 
(D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Morris, 562 F.3d 1131, 1135–
36 (10th Cir. 2009). 
                                                 
 7 The difference of opinion was intra-circuit as well as 
inter-circuit.  Fenton was decided over a dissent, which reasoned 
that “the risk that [the] defendant would use the firearms was 
increased by the fact that he was a convicted felon and by the 
fact that he possessed those firearms during a burglary.”  309 
F.3d at 829 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
 
 8 Previously on the Fenton side of the circuit split, the 
Seventh Circuit in Krumwiede held that Amendment 691 
abrogated its precedent.  See 599 F.3d at 790. 
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V 
 The District Court erred procedurally when it relied on 
Fenton to calculate Keller’s Guidelines range.  Accordingly, we 
will vacate the judgment and remand so the District Court can 
recalculate Keller’s Guidelines range by applying the four-point 
enhancement in USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) before considering the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and imposing a new judgment of 
sentence. 
